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HOW TO MAKE SURE THAT EVERYONE WORKS
TOWARDS A COMMON GOAL: TOWARDS OPTIMAL
INCENTIVES
Formulation of the problem. A company as a whole is interested in

increasing its prot. It is therefore desirable to com up with incentives
that encourage everyone to work toward the common goal.

This problem is not easy. In spite of all the eorts to come up with

reasonable incentives, the existing incentives schemes are not perfect.
Everyone who has worked for a large company knows of turf wars and
other problems, as a result of which divisions within the company often
hurt each other instead of productively working towards a common goal.

Stock incentive: a seemingly reasonable solution. At rst glance,

a natural way to make everyone interested in the common goal is to
make the incentive proportional to the company's success. This can be
achieved, e.g., by giving employees stock options as part of their salaries:
this way, the better o the company, the largest the actual salary.

Alas, this seemingly reasonable idea often does not work.

At
rst glance, the stock incentive idea should work well. But imagine a
typical employee of a very large company. His/her success contributes to
only a tiny portion of the company's prot. So, whether this employee
does not do anything or works really hard, the overall prot practically
does not change  and thus, the employee's salary does not change.
So, the stock option scheme is actually a disincentive: if we take
into account the eorts needed to work hard, the employees are thus
encouraged to do nothing  and therefore, the company's prots decrease.
So, what is a good incentives scheme?

1

Our proposal: main idea.

Our proposal is that instead of making
the salary proportional to the overall company prot, we should make it
proportional to the person's contribution to this prot.

Our proposal: discussion.

It is important to take into account the
eect of the person's contribution under the assumption that everyone
else works optimally. For example, a worker who produces a certain
number of gadgets should be rewarded because if the sales department
works well, these gadgets will bring extra credit to the company.
However, if the sales department is not functioning well and the gadgets
are not sold, the company only experiences a loss  loss of materials,
expenses needed for storing the gadgets, etc.
This idea deals with everyone who is necessary for the company's
success: workers, janitors, accountants, investors, managers, etc.
Let us formulate this idea in precise terms.

Our proposal: a description in precise terms. Let us rst introduce
some notations:

• let n be the total number of employees,
• let Xi be the set of all possible actions of the i-th employee,
• let 0 ∈ Xi be the case when the i-th employee does not do anything,
• let p(x1 , . . . , xn ) be the prot gained by the company when each
employee i performs action xi , and
∈ Xi be the actual action performed by the i-th employee.
• let xact
i
In these notation, the reward ri (xact
i ) to the i-th employee should be
equal to
ri (xact
i )=

max

p(x1 , . . . , xi−1 , xact
i , xi+1 , . . . , xn )−

max

p(x1 , . . . , xi−1 , 0, xi+1 , . . . , xn ).

x1 ∈X1 ,...,xi−1 ∈Xi−1 ,xi+1 ∈Xi+1 ,...

x1 ∈X1 ,...,xi−1 ∈Xi−1 ,xi+1 ∈Xi+1 ,...

(1)

This idea is similar to the main idea behind the Shapley
vector, which is determined in terms of the dierences v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)
between what the coalition S can get for itself and what it can get if it
collaborates with the i-th participant; see, e.g., [1].
Comment.
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This proposal indeed leads to the optimal global solution.

Indeed, let us assume that there is exactly one combination of strategies
opt
(xopt
1 , . . . , xn ) that results in the maximal prot, i.e., for which
opt
p(xopt
1 , . . . , xn ) =

max

x1 ∈X1 ,...,xi−1 ∈Xi−1 ,xi ∈Xi ,xi+1 ∈Xi+1 ,...

p(x1 , . . . , xi−1 , xi , xi+1 , . . . , xn ).

In this case, the following statement holds.

Proposition 1. In situations when there is only combination of actions
that leads to the optimal solution, if every employee maximizes the value

ri (xi ),

the the resulting combination of strategies is optimal.

Proof. Since the second term in ri (xi ) does not depend on xi , the largest

possible value of ri (xi ) is attained when the rst term is the largest, i.e.,
when the prot p(x1 , . . . , xn ) attains its largest possible value. By our
assumption, this is exactly when xi = xopt
i . The statement is proven.

Discussion: what do we do if there are many optimizing
combinations of strategies? It may happen that there are several

combinations of strategies that lead to optimal solution. For example,
suppose that we are running a bus company in a small town where there
are two bus drivers and two bus routes. The optimal solution is when:

• either driver A runs route B and driver B runs route A,
• or driver A runs route A and driver B runs route B.
However, if both driver A and B run the same route A, then for both
the reward will be optimal but the overall prot will be a disaster, since
no one runs route B.
To avoid such situations, we need an additional coordination between
workers, which will rearrange the sets Xi to guarantee the desired
uniqueness.

But can we aord this solution? Absolutely: if everyone works ne,
every worker get exactly what he or she contributed.

Of course, if someone screwed up and the company loses
money, we may not have any prot to divide between the employees:
but this is true irrespective of how we decide to divide the prot.
Comment.

3

Acknowledgments. This work was supported in part by the National

Science Foundation grants HRD-0734825, HRD-1242122, and DUE0926721.

Ëèòåðàòóðà.

1. Luce, R.D., and Raia, H. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical
Survey  New York: Dover, 1989.

4

